DOJ Complaint

February 21, 2014
April 7, 2014

Richard Hylton
13166 Jane Court
San Diego CA 92129
858.444.5874 (cell)
858-484-6330 (home)



U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Rights Division
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Office of the Assistant Attorney General, Main
Washington, D.C. 20530

Federal Coordination and Compliance Section - NWB
Civil Rights Division
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530

Coordination and Review Section 
Civil Rights Division 
U.S. Department of Justice 
P.O. Box 66560 
Washington, D.C. 20035-6560

Re: The City of San Diego, Racial Profiling
By Email to: askdoj@usdoj.gov

Dear Attorney General;
The writing of this letter was begun on February 21, 2014. Its completion was delayed as I awaited San Diego Vehicle Stop data, for 2000-2012. It was requested under California’s public records’ act. All of that data has been refused me.

Hyperlinks should provide access to referenced documents. Please write if any fail.
The great American statistician and philosopher Bill Parcells, expounding on winning in the NFL, observed "You are what your record says you are." ESPN, recognizing the indisputable nature of Parcells' comment, in 2011, created a program called Numbers Never Lie.

The SDPD seems to disagree with those numbers mavens, despite what its published Vehicle Stop Analysis record and numbers say about Vehicle Stops. Thirteen years ago, its numbers and record also said what is excerpted below from a publication entitled An Evaluation of Racial Profiling Data Collection and Training (by pure serendipity, Lansdowne's[1] San Jose data immediately followed); nothing substantial, in the area of numbers, has changed for San Diego (nor in Lansdowne’s conduct, tactics or methods.) According to San Diego’s 2013 data; if anything, things got worse. But first the 2001 report excerpt:
San Diego
In May 2001, the San Diego Police Department released its report for vehicle stops made in 2000. The report found that both black and Hispanic drivers were stopped and searched at rates disproportionately high in comparison to their driving age populations.
Comparison to Accident Data. In seeking another reasonable proxy for drivers on the road, San Diego compared their data to non-hit-and-run traffic accidents (assuming accidents do not vary by race or ethnicity). These accident data varied somewhat from the population and traffic stop rates. Still, the department cautioned against using these traffic data because of the potential for (1) the underreporting of accidents in immigrant communities and (2) neighborhood variations in accidents.
Age Analysis. Because younger drivers were stopped more often and black and Hispanic populations tend to be younger in San Diego than the white population, the report hypothesized that age differences might account for the stop differentials. Yet, upon analyzing racial stops by age, the report found that blacks and Hispanics were still overrepresented in stops in virtually every age category.

Again; nothing has changed with respect to San Diego’s police conduct with regard to police practices and the denials. We have a newly-elected mayor who denies that Racial Profiling practices, by police, exists here. His hand-picked new Chief of Police, Zimmerman, running in lockstep denies too[2]. Without going into time-wasting exercises, of looking at age groups and the like, I have chosen to let San Diego’s raw numbers speak for themselves, after aggregation, since numbers never lie.

In 2013 Blacks and Hispanics were stopped at a rate that is a multiple of whites, like so:

Race
Rate Data%
Population %
Rate to Population
Compared to Whites
White
42.01
76.7
55.00%
100.00%
Hispanic *
32.32
32.7
99.00%
180.00%
Black/African American
9.29
5.6
166.00%
301.82%
Nat. Hawaiian and Other
6.6
0.6
1100.00%
2000.00%
Asian
5.22
11.6
45.00%
81.82%



Concern about Racial Profiling in San Diego is not new, its stop-results are featured prominently in the ACLU’s amicus brief on the successful side of Brendlin v. California. However that concern has re-emerged as the result of one not so-recent incident that has recently cost money. The most prominent recent case is the Case of Harrell and Robinson. It was hot on the heels of and accompanied by other sex-based violations by SDPD officers. San Diego is so determined to keep a lid on the Harrell and Robinson matter that today, even after the case has been settled, it continues to refuse to release publicly disclosable data by claiming an ongoing investigation.

Recent public hearings and PR campaigns disclose that complaints are, quite obviously, not isolated incidents; instead, they demonstrate patterns and practices that are deeply engrained in the culture of the SDPD and are doubtless the result of ineffectual leadership[3].  From this there is no local or administrative method for relief, especially since the city authorities are hell-bent on data concealment, including the issuance of patently-false sworn statements regarding it.

The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 act includes a provision, 42 U.S.C. Section 14141, authorizing the Department of Justice (DOJ)—but not to me—to bring civil actions for equitable and declaratory relief against any police agency engaged in unconstitutional “patterns or practices.” DOJ’s Civil Rights Division has moved against state and local law enforcement agencies engaged in a “pattern or practice” of police abuse under 42 U.S.C. Section 14141, again relying on statistical evidence of discriminatory enforcement patterns.

You need to do so with respect to San Diego, irrespective of so-called DOJ audits that may be taking place at the present time.

The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3711, was enacted to “aid State and local governments in strengthening and improving their systems of criminal justice by providing financial and technical assistance.” State and local governments receiving assistance are prohibited from discriminating in programs or activities funded in whole or in part by the federal largesse. The Civil Rights Division of DOJ is responsible for enforcing the statute, which authorizes civil actions by the federal government, allows individuals to pursue a private right of action, and authorizes DOJ to terminate assistance to fund recipients found guilty of discrimination. I am partly persuaded that San Diego’s haste to have a DOJ Federal “Audit” of its police practices is, at least in part, motivated by this provision of the law. Good sense dictates it. My personal sanctions were always lighter when I disclosed my own peccadilloes.

An audit that does not use the Citation Data[4] for several years and is cross-referenced to DMV data, shall be farcical. I have and can demonstrate that race and ethnic data has been fabricated or falsified by law enforcement personnel. Doubtless; your department has seen that happen too, so data-validation, of some sort, must be employed. Blacks are often misidentified as Whites, deliberately, for reasons that appear obvious, at least to me.

As mentioned before, since at least 2000, the San Diego Police Department has captured Vehicle stop data that indicates that Blacks and Hispanics have been stopped and searched at rates that are significantly higher than Whites. And despite the clear conclusions –or lack thereof- and statements in reports created from its data, that it published, San Diego, through its former Chief Lansdowne, in a public meeting, has falsely claimed that it has received the equivalent of a clean bill of health. To San Diego, a clean bill of health is its failure to sustain complaints of Racial Profiling that were lodged with and investigated by the San Diego Police Department. We may have seen something similar in New Jersey, recently.

In fact the report to which San Diego points, in its most public announcements, comes to quite different conclusions. As a whole, the report finds no explanation for San Diego’s disparate stop rates, although it gropes or grasps for some, by using speculation. This writer, upon hearing false public statements, connected with the 2001 report, too many times, communicated with one of the writers of the written report. His response is linked here.
                                
As mentioned, in recent weeks, in an apparent attempt to evade legal action or administrative sanctions, the San Diego Police Department, through different spokespersons, has issued many contradictory statements concerning the status of or existence of data. They also claim that data collection was discontinued, due to a lack of interest. They say anything. All this is claimed despite the issuance of multiple instructions[5], to the officer corps, instructing them to complete or enter traffic stop data that captures race or ethnicity[6]. Analysis of said data, just like 2000 and 2001, likely will point to the existence of a pattern or practice that San Diego would have to overcome by justifying its disparate treatment of certain demographic groups. In other words, the data that is being withheld is unlikely to be different from that which has been disclosed. Since its conduct cannot be justified, it distracts by claiming to embrace new technology to assist it in precisely determining the demographics[7] (of people stopped.)

The data exists, not only from the Vehicle Stop Database but also in the citations database.

Indisputable is the fact that San Diego does collect racial or ethnic data on every cited motorist. This data identifies the officer(s) by Badge Number; it might identify the officer(s) by name. Since San Diego’s procedures[8] promise rather guarantees officer anonymity (effective immunity) it rejects using data from the citation database since that is inimical to its officer’s immunity interests. Indeed, on page 5 of San Diego’s last Vehicle Stop Analysis, it was reported that officers regard this information as “potentially threatening paperwork.” So, unfettered by any prospect of being held accountable for “Whren[9]” violations, the denial existence denial persists, and the status quo is maintained, now accompanied by the distraction of a Community or Neighbourhood Public Relations campaign.

DOJ’s reserved powers

The conduct of San Diego implicates 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 that makes it is a crime for one or more persons acting under color of law willfully to deprive or conspire to deprive another person of any right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

This law makes it unlawful for State or local law enforcement officers to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct that deprives persons of rights protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. (42 U.S.C. § 14141). The types of conduct covered by this law can include, among other things, excessive force, discriminatory harassment, false arrests, coercive sexual conduct, and unlawful stops, searches or arrests. In order to be covered by this law, the misconduct must constitute a "pattern or practice" -- it may not simply be an isolated incident. The DOJ must be able to show in court that the agency has an unlawful policy or that the incidents constituted a pattern of unlawful conduct. However, unlike the other civil laws discussed below, DOJ does not have to show that discrimination has occurred in order to prove a pattern or practice of misconduct. That hurdle is not insurmountable with regard to San Diego. And, with respect to San Diego, particular attention is deserved because it flouted and ignored the Department of Justice’s advice to identify correct, train and re-train officers who display constitutionally infirm conduct, A Resource Guide on Racial Profiling Data Collection Systems, page 46:

Name and identification number of the officers who initiated or participated
in the stop. One of the most controversial aspects of stop-and-search
data collection is whether to collect the identity of the officer making the
stop. There are several analytical advantages to recording these data.
Adopting such an approach enables organizations to identify potential
problem officers who may be disproportionately stopping minorities. In
this sense, the data collection process functions as an early warning system,
alerting management to problems and allowing them to investigate
possible extenuating circumstances and, if necessary, to intervene early
with counseling, training, or some other intervention.

………………………………………………..…The purpose of recording
the identity of the officer should be to diagnose and remedy problems as
part of an early warning system. As New Jersey Attorney General Farmer
stated: “It [data collection] is definitely supposed to be part of an early
warning system that enables us to identify a potential problem, go in and
fix it rather than waiting for it to fester. For it to be an early warning system,
we didn’t see any way to do it unless we had officer identification.”
Departments should consider a procedure that requires the officer’s identity
to be recorded but uses the data primarily for training and support.
Officers identified as engaging in any unusual pattern of vehicle stops
would review the information with their immediate supervisors. If this
pattern (or a similarly unusual pattern) persists, the behavior would be
brought to the attention of the human resources unit of the department,
and assistance/training would be offered to the officer. If these two steps
are followed and the officer still behaves in a disturbing manner in trafficstops,
the matter should be dealt with using the department’s normal
disciplinary procedures.

A pattern and practice of misconduct can be inferred from San Diego’s data (including the concealment of it) and the department of Justice has the power to compel production of that data, including the data that identifies the officers. Doubtless; it has the will to bring that about.

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and the "OJP Program Statute"
Together, these laws prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, and religion by State and local law enforcement agencies that receive financial assistance from the Department of Justice. (42 U.S.C. § 2000d, et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 3789d(c)). Since San Diego receives DOJ funds, it is prohibited from employing customs, patterns or practices of discriminatory misconduct, i.e., treating a person differently because of race, color, national origin, sex, or religion. I understand that I must first exhaust my administrative remedies by filing a complaint with DOJ if I wish to file in Federal Court under the OJP Program Statute. I do complain.
My complaint
Accordingly my complaint is included here. I have elected to use illustrations for the heavy lifting. They are at the end of this communication as Exhibits 1 and 2 on pages 10 and 11.
On May 12, 2010, on my way to work I was sighted, scrutinized, pursued and stopped by Emery Enriquez and Billy Andal, two San Diego Police officers. These were men who frequented my neighourhood and who I had driven past, but  never faced, over an extended period. My registration tags were expired. Neither could see that my registration was in the process of being renewed. Despite my providing both officers with evidence of that fact (the Online Renewal), they impounded my vehicle, which forced me to walk home. As a consequence I have suffered significant hardships for years. Under California Law a vehicle where registration renewal is in process may not be seized. The California Superior Court, County of San Diego agreed with my position; in fact it reinforced my previously held view.
San Diego justifies its use of race as a proxy for criminogenic tendencies as here:
“Black/African American drivers were over-represented in each of the major categories of searches (inventory, incident to arrest, 4th waiver, and consent), but particularly in 4th amendment waiver searches (see Table 18). Police in California are authorized to conduct these types of searches of parolees and some probationers. Since 42% of parolees in San Diego are Black/African American, the fact that 36% of 4th waiver searches in 2001 involved Black/African American drivers would not seem to indicate unfair or discriminatory police use of their search authority.”
This view would, by extension, allow the stop and search of 42% of the Black driving public. Its sophistry is offensive and indicative of intellectual laziness. It is offensive on its face, and its lack of logic should be criminally silly. (Damn the presumption and fact that the great majority of the blacks are guilty of nothing, other than of being black.) Whatever it is, it is constitutionally infirm and is precisely what the Supreme Court alluded to in Whren. Indeed; that which San Diego trumpets as justification for its actions undermines it under disparate treatment and or disparate impact analysis[10]. Here it is indisputable that the differences in its data values for groups are not insubstantial and accordingly the inference of causation is unavoidable; See Stout v. Potter, 276 F.3d 1118, 1122 (9th Cir. 2002.) In fact, no responsible study supports a suggestion or conclusion that any racial or ethnic group has more criminal tendencies than any other. Yet the view persists, doubtless fostered by San Diego and those of like mind. This very Justice Department noticed the above fallacy in its observation from 2003 in A Resource Guide on Racial Profiling Data Collection Systems, at page 11:
“In many cases, disproportionate minority arrests for drug possession and
distribution have fueled perceptions by police and others that race is an
appropriate factor in the decision to stop or search an individual. However,
existing data on the productivity of searches across racial groups
suggest that stop-and-search practices have become a game of “search and
you will find.” Police officers who aggressively and disproportionately
search people of color will arrest more people of color than Whites, not because
of differences in behavior, but because they are stopping and searching
many more people of color than Whites. Regardless of whether the
perception that Blacks and Latinos are more likely to be found in possession
of contraband could be empirically verified, United States laws do
not, and should not, permit race to be used as a basis for stopping and
searching individuals.”
The time for this conduct has passed, long passed. Nothing persuades the powerful as effectively as the economic prod. 42 U.S.C. Section 14141 and The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3711 and other Federal laws are the ideal combination for rectifying the wrongs that have persisted in San Diego for well over 15 years. The problem in San Diego is not ignorance, it is intransigence, and it is bigotry. I quote or paraphrase remarks of U.S. Judge Orlando Garcia[11], “Without a rational relation to a legitimate government purpose, city-imposed inequality in policing can find no refuge in our United States Constitution."
San Diego’s derogatory nickname Mississippi of the west is not undeserved. This year is 2014.
Sincerely;

Richard Hylton
13166 Jane Court
San Diego CA 92129
858.444.5874 (cell)
858-484-6330 (home)






Exhibit 1. The encounter and Pursuit. Maps from Google Earth




Exhibit 2, The Carjacking called an impounding





[1] William Lansdowne, Chief of Police, City of San Diego in March 2014 was Chief of Police, City of San Jose in at least
1999-2003. A Resource Guide on Racial Profiling Data Collection Systems, page 11. The results in Lansdowne’s San Jose track those in Lansdowne’s San Diego for 2000-2001 and 2013; i.e., Blacks and Hispanics stopped at rates greater than their presence in the Population, Whites less. A Resource Guide on Racial Profiling Data Collection Systems, page 22.

[2]Zimmerman won’t say racial profiling is happening”. To say otherwise would do my work for a necessary showing; and provide the DOJ with over-kill capacity.

[3][3] When this writing began, William Lansdowne was the Police Chief of San Diego. He has since resigned.
[4] Inspection of data gathered from Vehicle Stop Forms and comparison to Citation data shows that Citation data contains all of the Vehicle Stop data elements in addition to those recommended by the DOJ.
[5] Three memoranda written by Chief Lansdowne since 2006, reminding officers of the duty and necessity of completing vehicle stop data.

[6] They always did and continue to do so about 100% of the time, in the Citation database(s).
[7] Impure nonsense and a gambit tried, without success, in San Jose in 1999. The absurdity of the suggestion was captured by a commenter; local I believe.
MikeHall
“This notion of cameras catching the race of someone is antiintellectual. Science doesn't recognize race. I don't know how a camera is going to do this. If one were able to classify a person by race with a camera, the camera would need to be able to deal with the many mixes of humanity that exist today. This attempt at taking the issue of "race" from the responsibility of the police and placing it in the realm of robot cameras is only made in order to deflect the broader argument related to why the police need this information. Absurd, and expensive.”

To allay these fears, SDPD undertook an extensive training program to explain
to officers the purposes of the program, the nature and extent of community
perceptions, how the data would be analyzed, and how the
program would affect each officer. The department chose not to include officer
identification in the stop-and-search data collection system.
[9] Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996),
The Supreme Court itself, in Whren, specifically noted that; “We of course agree with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race.” (Whren v. United States, supra, at p. 813 [135 L.Ed.2nd at p. 98].)

Discrimination by law enforcement officers based upon a person’s race in the providing of both protective and non-protective services is a constitutional equal protection violation. (Ae Ja Elliot-Park v. Manglona (9th Cir. 2010) 592 F.3rd 1003.)


[10] San Diego targets minorities for enhanced scrutiny then seeks to justify it by referring to statistics; ignoring the inherent fallacy of its approach. If the first group is examined 3 times as often as the other while both commit crimes at the same rate, the former will be convicted and incarcerated at three times the rate of the latter.
[11] In the case of Cleopatra De Leon and Nicole Dimetman of Austin, who wanted Texas to recognize their 2009 marriage in Massachusetts, and Vic Holmes and Mark Phariss of Plano, who have been together for 16 years and wish to be married in Texas.

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